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JUDICIARY LAW

Judiciary Law § 495(5): Court of Appeals limits scope of appellate
division's review of legal services plans.
Section 495 of the Judiciary Law provides that no corporation
or voluntary association may practice law. 19 5 There are, however; a
number of exceptions to this general prohibition, including one
which permits organizations with either benevolent or charitable
purposes, or with the purpose of securing civil remedies for persons of limited financial resources, to be involved in the furnishing
of legal services. 196 To avail themselves of this statutory exception,
these organizations must obtain the prior approval of the appellate
division. 19 7 Recently, in Feinstein v. Attorney-General,198 decided with
New York County Lawyer's Association v. Appellate Division, First Department, the Court of Appeals significantly limited the ambit of
investigation which the appellate division may conduct when re199
viewing the propriety of a proposed prepaid legal services plan.
The Feinstein Court held that the appellate division cannot reject an
applicant's request for an exemption where that rejection is based
solely upon the determination that the proposed plan is in the
20 0
nature of insurance.
195 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw §§ 495(1)-(2) (McKinney 1968). This provision supersedes
former N.Y. Penal Law § 280, ch. 483, § 1, [1909] N.Y. Laws 2. The primary justification for
the enactment of this statute was the fear that corporation-employed attorneys might show
greater loyalty to the corporation than to the confidential interests of their clients. See, e.g.,
People v. Peoples Trust Co., 180 App. Div. 494, 167 N.Y.S. 767 (2d Dep't 1917). See also
Kelly v. Greason, 23 N.Y.2d 368, 375-76, 244 N.E.2d 456, 460, 296 N.Y.S.2d 937, 943-44
(1968).
19 6
See N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 495(5) (McKinney 1968).
"' Id. Applications of corporations or voluntary associations seeking to operate a law
office are passed upon by the department of the appellate division having jurisdiction over
the principal office of such organization. Id. After approval is granted, the organization
remains under the scrutiny, disciplinary control, and regulation of the appellate division. See
22 N.Y.C.R.R. 608.7 (1975). See also In re Pinkard, 28 App. Div. 2d 34, 280 N.Y.S.2d 959
(4th Dep't 1967).
Although a legal assistance corporation need not be sponsored by lawyers, the day-today functions of the organization must be supervised by persons competent to practice law in
the State. See In re Community Action for Legal Servs. Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 354, 361, 274
N.Y.S.2d 779, 787 (Ist Dep't 1966). In addition, approved corporations must have relatively
small directorates in order to promote their amenability to discipline and sanction by the
court. Id. Present rules of the Appellate Division, First Department, limit the board of
directors to 30 members, a majority of whom must be attorneys licensed to practice law in
New York. 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 608.6 (1975). Although according to these rules approval is
limited to a three-year period, an extension for an indefinite period is available. Id. 608.5.
198 36 N.Y.2d 199, 326 N.E.2d 288, 366 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1975) (Breitel, C.J.), rev'g In re
Feinstein, 45 App. Div. 2d 440, 357 N.Y.S.2d 516 (Ist Dep't 1974). The procedural rules
governing § 495 applications and the first department's responsibilities in considering these
applications are set forth in 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 608 (1975).
199 36 N.Y.2d at 204-05, 326 N.E.2d at 291, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 617-18.
2
00 Id.
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While the Feinstein application involved a legal services program for union members, to be financed through a welfare fund
trust,20 1 the Lawyer's Association application involved an attempt to
establish an independent corporation to provide reimbursement of
legal fees incurred by its subscribers.2 °2 The Appellate Division,
First Department, finding no pertinent differences in the details of
the two applications, considered them jointly and rejected both on
the grounds that the court had neither the authority nor the
resources to supervise what it considered to be insurance
schemes.

20 3

In an earlier opinion, In re Application of Community Action for
Legal Services, Inc.,2 °4 the first department had defined its role in
evaluating applications for proposed plans as a responsibility to
assess authenticity, to assure freedom from improper professional conduct, to make certain that lawyer-client relationships are
preserved, and to insure that the subject organization remains
under the disciplinary control of the court. 20 5 In reversing Feinstein, the Court of Appeals stated that the appellate division had
improperly failed to limit its concern to these guidelines.2 0 6 The
Court also stated that the appellate division is not to concern itself
with the controversy over "open panel" and "closed panel" prepaid
legal services plans. 0 7 Unless the plan, on its face, is clearly illegal
201 The application submitted in Feinstein was proposed by a union of low-to-middle
income municipal employees. The plan provided for a specified variety of legal services to be
rendered by a law firm representing the union. In addition to a moderate initial charge,
union members would be required to pay for services in excess of those available under the
plan. As a "closed panel" plan, there would be no reimbursement of fees for lawyers the
members retained on their own. Id. at 203-04, 326 N.E.2d at 290, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 616.
"Closed panel" plan is defined in note 207 infra.
202 The plan proposed by the New York County Lawyer's Association involved the use
of a separate corporation set up to provide reimbursement for legal services rendered to
middle-income persons paying a modest cost for membership. Since subscribers would be
free to choose their lawyers from a panel of participants whose fees would be predetermined
according to a schedule, the plan, to a limited extent, would be "open panel." Id. at 204, 326
N.E.2d at 290, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 616-17. "Open panel" plan is defined in note 207 infra.
203 45 App. Div. 2d at 441, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
204 26 App. Div. 2d 354, 274 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1st Dep't 1966) (Breitel, J.).
205
Id. at 359-62, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 786-88. The criteria enumerated in Community Action
are not exclusive tests for evaluating the merits of a proposed plan. The court may consider
any factor relevant to the protection of the public, which factor is the "paramount and final
determinant." Id. at 364, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
206 36 N.Y.2d at 202-05, 326 N.E.2d at 290-91, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 616-18.
2 07
d. at 205, 326 N.E.2d at 291, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 618.
An "open panel" plan theoretically permits subscribing clients to either freely choose
private attorneys or select from those participating in a particular program. The plan then,
in much the same way as a health insurance plan might work, reimburses the client for the
attorneys' fees expended. A "dosed panel" plan provides for a retained set of attorneys to
whom member clients ,are assigned. Resembling the operation of a health clinic, it involves
no free choice or selection. See, e.g., N. SHAYNE, PREPAID LEGAL SERvIcEs 4-5 (AMA Man-
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or fraudulent, 20 8 it seems clear from Feinstein that the scope of the
appellate division's inquiry may not extend to extraneous, i.e.
non-Community Action, questions. Although it conceded that the
proposed plans might be regulated by the Superintendent of Insurance,20 9 the Court indicated that they were not within the "spirit
0
and purpose of the existing provisions of the Insurance Law. '21
Even assuming that an evaluation of the Insurance Law implications should be made, the Court found that neither plan, at least
on its face, involved insurance, and therefore the appellate division's inability to conduct a detailed analysis in terms of the Insurance Law was considered an inappropriate ground for rejecting the
21
applications. 1
agement Briefing 1974); Wilson, Justice Department and Other Views on Prepaid Legal Services
Plans Get an Airing Before the Tunney Subcommittee, 60 A.B.A.J. 791 (1974). See also Note, Legal
Service Plans -Coming of Age, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 137, 156-61 (1974).
The proliferation of legal services plans, which plans are recognized as a legitimate
exercise of constitutional freedoms, see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), is a relatively
recent phenomenon. In Button, the United States Supreme Court held that an organization
may employ attorneys to advise and assist others in the enforcement of their legal rights.
Button further held that such a program of legal representation is protected by the first
amendment freedoms of expression and association. Id. at 437. More recently, the United
States Supreme Court held that labor unions have a constitutionally protected right to
establish and maintain a legal services plan which may enforce claims for its members. See
United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). Accordingly, the American Bar
Association, which had consistently opposed the concept of prepaid legal services plans,
finally stated that it is ethically sound for an attorney to participate in such programs. See
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(D), 2-104, 2-105(A)(3).

208 36 N.Y.2d at 205, 207, 326 N.E.2d at 291-92, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 617-18, 619. Where
the plan
is clearly illegal or fraudulent, approval must be denied by the appellate division. Id.
20 9
Id. at 206-07, 326 N.E.2d at 292, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 619. The Superintendent of the
Insurance Department has extensive statutory authority to ensure compliance with all provisions of the Insurance Law. See N.Y. INS. LAw § 35 (McKinney 1966). Desiring not to invade
the province of the Insurance Department, the appellate division determined that it was
precluded from considering an application having the characteristics of insurance. 45 App.
Div. 2d at 441, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
210 36 N.Y.2d at 209, 326 N.E.2d at 294, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 621. See also id. at 208, 326
N.E.2d at 293, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
211 Id. at 204, 207, 326 N.E.2d at 291, 292, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 617, 619. In considering
whether "on their face" these plans were insurance schemes, the Court directed its attention
to N.Y. INS. LAw § 41(1) (McKinney 1966) which defines an "insurance contract" as
any agreement or other transaction whereby one party ... is obligated to confer
benefit of pecuniary value upon another party ... dependent upon the happening
of a fortuitous event in which the insured or beneficiary has, or isexpected to have
at the time of such happening, a material interest which will be adversely affected
by the happening of such event. A fortuitous event is any occurrence or failure to
occur which is, or is assumed by the parties to be, to a substantial extent beyond the
control of either party.
Construing this section in a literal sense, the Court in Feinstein stated:
The proposed prepaid legal service plans are not insurance businesses or insurance
contracts . ...

Viewed as a provider of professional services, sought as a matter of choice, at
flat fees rather than as reimbursement for material losses or expenses precipitated
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It is submitted that the Court of Appeals' decision recognizes
that legal services plans are coming of age and that such plans must
serve middle-income as well as indigent persons.2 1 2 Despite, as
noted by the Court, the absence of adequate legislative provisions
with respect to review and control of such plans, 13 Feinstein appears to have created an environment more favorable to their
development and growth.2 1 4 It is not, however, the Court's first
step in this direction. In In re Thom, 21 5 for example, section 495's
"benevolent purpose" language was liberally viewed as intended to
21 6
extend to more than just the assistance of indigents.
Both Feinstein and Thom manifest a sympathetic view towards
applicants seeking section 495(5) approval. While Feinstein indicates a willingness to limit the scope of the appellate division's
review pursuant to section 495(5), Thom encourages liberal statutory construction with regard to areas found to be within the
bounds of that review. This is not to suggest that the appellate
division's role is either meaningless or insignificant. Under existing
law, it is faced with the difficult tasks of preventing commercialization of the legal profession, maintaining ethical standards, and
by fortuitous events, the proposed plans do not pose the dangers that the Insurance
Law was designed to obviate.
36 N.Y.2d at 208, 326 N.E.2d at 293, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 620-21.
The Court further indicated that prepaid legal services are not insurance schemes since
the need for a number of the legal services provided by the plan is not precipitated by a
fortuitous event beyond the control of the parties. The drafting of a will and the purchase of
a house were cited as examples. Id.
212 The Court noted that current literature is
largely unanimous that new paths must be staked out to make legal services available to persons between those served by poverty-level schemes and those rich
enough to purchase legal services without assistance or extraordinary measures ....
36 N.Y.2d
at 206, 326 N.E.2d at 292, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 619 (citations omitted).
213
0 1d. at 209-10, 326 N.E.2d at 293-94, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 621-22.
214 Notably, the Court, instead of affirming the appellate division decision and leaving
the matter to legislative resolution, chose to limit judicially the scope of review permissible
under § 495, thus facilitating, in the absence of legislative action, the approval of legal
services plans.
215 33 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.E.2d 542, 347 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1973) (per curiam), rev'g 40 App.
Div. 2d 787, 337 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1st Dep't 1972).
216 In Thorn, the Appellate Division, First Department, had denied approval of a legal
defense fund created to ensure the rights of homosexuals. Since the applicant would not
have limited its services to indigents, the court found that the organization could be deemed
neither benevolent nor charitable. 40 App. Div. 2d at 787, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 589. The Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded. In a lengthy concurring opinion, Judge Burke construed the "benevolent purpose" language of § 495(5) and stated that approval should be
granted to any corporation whose application satisfied the requirements of part 608, see note
198 supra, and Community Action regardless of the financial situation of the individuals
included in the class proposed to be served. 33 N.Y.2d at 613-16, 301 N.E.2d at 544-46, 347
N.Y.S.2d at 574-76 (Burke, J., concurring). See also Green v. Javits, 7 Misc. 2d 312, 314-15,
166 N.Y.S.2d 198, 201 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd sub nom. Green v. Lefkowitz, 4 App. Div.
2d'869, 167 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1st Dep't 1957) (mem.).
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assuring that groundless or frivolous legal actions are not solicited
by applicant organizations. 2 17 At the same time, its obligation not to
create unnecessary obstacles to the approval of properly conceived
organizations appears evident.
The increasing number of proposed prepaid legal services
plans intended to serve middle-income persons,2 1 8 and, as demonstrated by Feinstein, the difficulties which our courts are having in
determining the requirements for such programs indicate that the
legislature should make the needed changes in the Judiciary Law as
soon as is practicable. Limited by the inadequacies of the present
statutory framework, the Court of Appeals has been virtually compelled to invite a two-stage approval process pursuant to which the
appellate division will review plans from one view point while the
Insurance Department will not be precluded from making an
independent, and possibly contrary, evaluation from another.
Further, both authorities will retain continuing supervisory and
regulatory functions. 21 9 A unified system of approval and supervision encompassing both professional and fiscal integrity is obviously needed.
"'See 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 608 (1975), which sets forth procedural guidelines for organizations seeking to qualify as § 495(5) benevolent corporations. Specifically, these rules deal with
the responsibility of sponsors, methods of financing, scope of proposed activities, and other
matters which may affect the public interest. In re Thom, 33 N.Y.2d 609, 611, 301 N.E.2d
542, 543, 347 N.Y.S.2d 571, 572 (1973) (per curiam). The appellate division, in enforcing
these rules, is faced with the additional burden of balancing the historical purpose of § 495,
see note 195 supra, with the flexible approach recently taken by the Court of Appeals. This
balancing process becomes particularly difficult where a proposed plan is in the nature of
insurance and conceivably not within the province of the appellate division. See N.Y. INS.
LAw § 35 (McKinney 1966). It is interesting to note, however, that the Feinstein Court stated
that even the Insurance Law may not actually encompass prepaid legal services plans. See
note 210 and accompanying text supra.
218
See proposals discussed in Note, Legal Serice Plans - Coming of Age, 49 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 137 (1975). The Federal Retirement Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq.
(Supp. 1975), precludes states from regulating union welfare plans. Hence, as noted by the
Feinstein Court, the number of such programs is almost certain to rise. 36 N.Y.2d at 209, 326
N.E.2d at 294, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 621. In addition, subsequent toFeinstein, a bill proposing that
insurance companies be permitted to issue group policies to provide legal care services was
approved by the New York State Senate. N.Y.S. 1001, 198th Sess. (1975). A similar bill is
now pending in the New York Assembly. N.Y.A. 941, 198th Sess. (1975). If passed, New
York will have legislatively approved legal services insurance pursuant to which persons
insured would hold contracts with private corporations. Depending upon the nature of the
contracts, subscribers would be free either to choose their own lawyer and be reimbursed for
fees expended or be guaranteed representation by a lawyer retained by the corporation.
Thus, both "open" and "closed panel" plans would be permitted. See also N.Y.S. 4887, 197th
Sess. (1974); N.Y.A. 8916, 197th Sess. (1974), cited in Feinstein v. Attorney-General, 36 N.Y.
2d 199, 209, 326 N.E.2d 288, 294, 366 N.Y.S.2d 613, 621 (1975).
2'9 Compare 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 608.7 (1975) with N.Y. INS. LAw § 35 (McKinney 1966).
Although both the appellate division and the Insurance Department perform essential
functions in relation to prepaid legal insurance services, it would appear that a consolidation
of their roles under a more definitive rule would avoid needless duplication of effort, yet
ensure that no significant area be overlooked.

